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LAW AND HUMAN  NATURE : THE SOCIAL-ADAPTIVE FUNCTION OF THE 
NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR
Abstract: The objective of this article is to offer a critical (re)interpretation of genesis and evolution, 
object and purpose, as well as useful qualified methods for interpreting, justifying and applying modern 
practical law, all with the intention of putting philosophic thought and contemporary formal theory of 
reason at the service of hermeutics and juridical argumentation. Law is no more—no less—than an 
social-adaptive strategy, evermore complex, but always noticeably deficient, used to articulate 
argumentatively—in fact, not always with justice—through the virtue of prudence, elementary relational 
social ties through which men construct approved styles of interaction and social structure, i.e., to 
organize and ethically improve political and social life in such a way as to permit that no free citizen—
rich or poor—should fear the arbitrary interference of other social actors in his life plan.
Atahualpa Fernandez
1. Problems in an analysis of the law from the perspective of 
the nature/culture interaction
Many centuries of debate on the origin of the law (and ethics) could be 
reduced to the following alternative: either ethical and juridical precepts, such as 
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Justice and human rights, appear thanks to human nature with the results that there 
are some innate rules on the behaviors and some universal morals determined by 
our nature, or these ethical and juridical precepts are socially constructed human 
inventions in the sense that nothing exists in the world of the law and ethics outside 
human agreement and disagreement.
The distinction, as we will see further ahead, assumes something more than 
a mere mental exercise for jurists and academic philosophers.  The choice of one of 
the hypotheses makes an important difference in the way it in which we see 
ourselves as a species, establishes a measure of the legitimacy and the authority of 
the law and the normative announcements, and determines, in the last instance, the 
conduct and the sense of practical ethical juridical reasoning.
The doubts still to be solved about the origin of the law present an apparent 
problem:  the search for  alternative means between natural law and juridical
positivism – but above and beyond both - has generated an explosion of productive 
creativity in very diverse investigation areas (ranging from philosophy to science of 
the law, and juridical argumentation, sociology, juridical hermeutics and many others)
and have attracted the attention of a growing number of investigators of recognized 
prestige and removed the jealousy from the different disciplines.  This is a problem 
because, as often happens when the structure of an area of work and investigation 
alters suddenly  and radically,  consternation and disorientation have been
generated.  The new concepts and the arguments about them have proliferated to 
the point that, on the one hand it has become very difficult, if not impossible, to 
maintain an informed and global perspective.  Furthermore, the general evaluation 
criteria that permit judgment of these new concepts and arguments have become 
weak and vulnerable.  The result of these inconveniences can be seen, for example, 
in the intellectual revolution that the cognitive sciences are causing.  Something 
similar is happening with innovating speed in philosophy and science of the law.
In the midst of this torment of academic production, the extraordinary 
proliferation of investigations and publications that in the last decades has directed
interests towards the reflection about the relationships that exist between cognitive 
science and evolutionary biology on the one hand, and sociology, social normative 
philosophy, anthropology and cultural evolution on the other, deny the existence of 
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unviable frontiers in the territory of science and question the idea that the “cultural 
reality” is constructed outside the natural determinations.
Although much of the social sciences and many of the law operators still
remain  outside this  new multidiscipline reality, it has started to jeopardize much of 
the traditional theoretical concepts of the normative social sciences and of juridical
science itself.  It makes the proposal viable (and even the demand) that new criteria 
for the knowledge sectors in law should be revised in the light of recent studies from 
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology, primatology and neuroscience.
Flexible behavior facilitates the acceptance they hypothesis that the 
juridical, social and human sciences will obtain more benefits if they set out from a 
vision linked to the biological  nature of man, following in the steps of the 
transformation of philosophy of the mind as part of the cognitive sciences, that if they 
remain in the theoretical and methodological isolation since the juridical
professionals pay little attention to the foundations of human nature and no interest 
whatsoever, in practice, to its deeper origins.  In other words, the theoretical gaps 
that are a problem to these professionals have been imposed by the little attention 
they have given to individual behavior that originated from the intersection of 
sophisticated cognitive problem with the social and cultural environment in which we 
move.
2. Why does the law exist?
If the need to change a paradigm is accepted, it seems reasonable to 
sustain that all operative forms destined to evaluate the problem of the juridical
phenomenon from the perspective  we could call naturalist should begin with a 
question: how is the law possible? or in other words, what is the function of the law in 
the context of human existence?
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The conventional Neo-Darwinian explication sustains that the possession of
behavior norms is an adaptive advantage, so that the original question about why we 
create the law, becomes what has constituted (or constitutes) the selective or 
adaptive advantage of the law.  Not being able to answer this question, the presence 
of the law in the universe of human existence will continue to be an enigma open to 
the most disparate  suppositions.
The truth is that such a focus  could be qualified as extreme adaptationalist.
Perhaps the norms of the law are, in their origin, a subproduct of other unknown 
adaptive functions on which they rest.  But it is certain that, if the juridical proposals 
need determined brain mechanisms to be processed, the reason for the existence of 
these mechanisms must be explained.  
Moral and social behavior is guided, in deepest terms, by our integrated 
cognitive architecture functioning in specific modules or dominions, whenever we 
understand these as neuronal networks that link various zones of the brain.  In most 
part this architecture is innate, but it needs environmental stimuli originating in the 
first instance from the social and linguistic surroundings to be completed during the 
ontogenetic maturity of the individual.  Thus only interactionist models between the 
innate substrate and the environment can describe accurately describe phenomenon 
of obtaining the neural structures whose functional behavior is translated into facts 
such as the juridical morals, the values assumed by an individual and decision
making, with the juridical values in the first instance because of the focus of this 
study.
Our evolution as a species took place, as far as we know, by Darwinian 
mechanisms and according to Darwinian limitations.  In consequence, the nature of 
the human being on the ground circumscribes the conditions of possibility of our 
societies, in particular, guiding and limiting the institutional and normative set that will 
regulate the social relationships.  The norms and values assumed by human beings 
appear within a very complex adaptation process (Darwinian), to the everyday  world.  
Unless we accept some theological proposals about the supernatural origin of 
axiology, any normative social (or juridical) theory that intends to be worthy of credit 
nowadays must sustain itself in a Darwinian model about human nature (Rose, 
2000).
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3. Neuronal bases of social and moral behavior
If we accept the previous statement, we arrive as the causal chain that 
justifies part of the process of the appearance of the law.  It has to do with 
circumstances and phylogenetic evolution, fixed already in our ancestors of the 
Homo genus, from some brains big and complete enough to sustain the cognitive 
architecture that allows us to make evaluative choices regarding behavior. But the 
undoubted obtainment  during human phylogenesis of some bigger and more 
complete brains shows an enigma.  Given that the neural tissue is the most 
expensive in terms of biological and energetic needs (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995), it 
cannot be believed that it was obtained accidentally.  There must be important 
benefits derived from the possession of larger brains.  About what are these 
benefits?  What do they consist of?
The response can be found searching for the appearance of 
phylogenetically fixed behavior.  Other species with a certain social complexity solve
their adaptive needs by other means.  Extreme altruistic behaviors have appeared 
during the evolution of living beings on our planet at least four times in the so-called 
“social”  species: the hymenoptera (ants, wasps, bees, termites), the parasite 
“prawn” of the anenomies and sea corals (Synalpheus regalis, Duffy, 1996), the 
hairless “rates-moles” (Heterocephalus glaber, O´Riain, Jarvis & Faulkes, 1996) and 
the primates (with human beings as the best example).  Neither the social insects, 
not the rats nor the parasitic skunks have a language like ours.  Their means of 
communication can be very complex.  Bees, for example, perform a specific dance 
exercise to transmit information about food location and quality.  The animals in the 
species closest to the humans, the chimpanzees, have a variety of gestures, shouts 
and other conducts to show or dissimulate fear and aggressiveness, and at times 
show a certain sense of justice, show desires to congregate and maintain complex 
sexual relationships (de Waal, 1996).  But they never use a double articulation 
language with syntactic structure.
Language can thus be considered the key to tracing the adaptive benefits 
capable of assuming an adaptive pressure on the big brains in the human beings.
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The linguistic ability unique to our species, that is the most important tool for 
culture transmission, brings us certain clear advantages in the strategy of social
survival that the more simple communication systems could not sustain.  Without 
doubt we follow, without knowing why, the adaptive advantage of the human 
language is great to the point that we are allowed to know  “who did what to whom”.
We can predict in terms of well-defined conduct the consequences of our congeners
but, at the same time, we are not able to give a precise definition of justice or to 
decide in which aspect the theory of natural law is preferable to that of a more 
tranquil positivism.
To try to understand and overcome the traditional obscurity of  theoretical 
discussions on analysis of law whose best perspective is functional, that is, that
which starts from an assumption of (and sometimes reductionist and/or eclectic) 
axiological, sociological or structural perspective, without trying to elucidate only for 
what the law serves in the environment of human existence.  The functional starting 
point does not oblige us to resort to the rhetorical expedient (the traditional relativist) 
of conditioning juridical knowledge to the obscure limits of the revelation of some 
theories that transcend understanding and the human experience itself.  It is not 
necessary to assume the existence of independent juridical truths that our 
intelligence is not able to process and understand, nor do we have to assume as 
unapproachable the reason that justify the existence of the law as one of the 
essential aspects of group life.
Once the establishment of the law is situated in an evolutionist and 
functional dimension, it seems reasonable to start from the hypothesis (empirically 
fertile) that the law appears and is justified by the need to compete successfully in a 
complex social life.  When our hominid ancestors faced  the adaptive problems
associated with complex group life, the selective pressures appeared in favor of 
cognitive processing organs capable of managing the universe of norms and values.  
We insist that this is a hypothesis.  But it is at least the same that justified the type of 
social behavior and cognitive abilities of other primates (Humphrey, 1976).  Thus the 
functional and adaptive optimization of the interaction mechanism would appear of 
certain elementary forms of sociability that seemed to be rooted in the structure of 
our mental architecture.
What would be these forms?
7
When trying to answer many of the questions about the way in which the 
organization of the human mind affects social relationships and conditions our moral
institutions, Alan P. Fiske (1993) stated that there are four elementary forms of 
sociability, for elementary models by which human beings construct some 
consensual way  of social interaction and social structure.  The four elemental 
models proposed by Fiske are the following: 1) communal sharing; 2) authority 
ranking; 3) market pricing; and 4) equality matching.  These four structures are found 
in a very extended form in all the human cultures examined by Fiske and are part of 
the more important areas of social life.  As the only possible explanation of this fact, 
the author suggests that they are based on the structures of the human mind.
As it seems unthinkable to treat the juridical relationship (or rather, the 
personal relationships of the human individuals that the juridical discourse identifies 
as such) without taking social interaction as reference, a simple examination of the 
characteristics of the four types of relational social ties proposed by Fiske allows us 
to discover firm articulation of these forms of social life: agreed ways of combining 
them, of enhancing and cultivating their best aspects, and mitigating and judging
their destructive and dangerous aspects.  This practice has an important 
consequence: as one admits that the law and “order” are relational in character, the 
realization of the law from an instrumental, pragmatic and dynamic perspective 
comes to be conceived as an intention, as a technique to solve determined practical 
programs related to behavior and intersubjective interference of the individuals 
(Kauffmann, 1997; Atienza, 2003).  
The best way of obtaining the shaping the elementary forms of sociability -
communal sharing, authority ranking, market pricing and equality matching - would 
be to develop suitable juridical instruments for their fair and balanced articulation.  It 
is, definitely, a way that leads to considering the law as argumentation and assumes, 
uses and in a certain way, gives meaning to the other theoretical perspectives 
related to the structural, sociological and axiological dimensions of the juridical
phenomenon. Consequently it seems reasonable to assume that a new theoretical 
proposal of juridical discourse should consider the circumstance where the 
argumentation is made in juridical life is, in essence, an argumentation on the 
various means by which the four forms of social life are articulated based on the 
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complex structure of the human mind and irreducible among themselves (Atahualpa 
Fernandez, 2002).
A Darwinian explanation of the evolution of the law understood in this 
manner assumes that the conduct norms(in this case, of  a juridical nature) will 
represent a selective or adaptive advantage for an essentially social species, such as 
ours, that otherwise would not be able to prosper.  Such norms shaped  the need to 
possess an operative mechanism that would publicly enable our innate capacity to 
infer the mental states and predict the behavior of individuals.  In this way social 
knowledge would be increased among the members of the group and the ability to 
solve social conflicts developed without having to resort to forms of hierarchy and 
social organization typical of many animal species, such as aggressiveness.  A 
juridical normative mechanism assumes the possibility of offering solutions for the 
practical and active problems surrounded in a non conlfictive way the fields in which 
the individual interests can be valid and exercised socially (Ricoeur, 1999).
4. The perspective of the “other”: advanced cooperation
There is a key element that deserves analysis to obtain in the human 
phylogenesis a mind/brain set to capable of producing, understanding and using the 
normative universe as a tool for individual adaptation within the group and of that 
group itself within its environment: the understanding and anticipation of the 
reactions of the “other”. 
Recognition of the other in social life is linked to the recognition of the self.  
The ability for self interpretation  is inseparable from the acquisition of the ability to 
interpret  others, to read their minds, to understand them and understand ourselves 
as intentional beings.  Although reflective individuals, we come to know ourselves in 
part through the eyes of others, and when we observe ourselves in relation to the 
others a very important part of our experience is our imagined vision about how the 
other members of the group see us.
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This ability for self observation through someone else´s mirror is one of the 
bases of human social life and the essence of the true meaning when we call
ourselves social beings.  Indeed it is also a crucial point in some of the refined 
mathematical models of the evolution of the social agents.  For example, Nowak and 
Sigmund (1998) offered a simulation model of the development of corporative groups 
in which indirect reciprocity in help was obtained by effective cooperation and  by
thanks of counting on a cooperator “image” (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, Wedekind, 
1998).  We will immediately return to this point.
We can only speculate on how the mental faculty of identifying the “other” 
as an intentional being was fixed in the homonid evolution, but there is signal that the 
need to adapt to new open habitats in the African savanna by the use of stone 
utensils in hunting and carroñeo  tasks could be assumed to have been sufficient 
selective pressure to establish strong social tendencies and favor the ulterior 
advance of the cognitive abilities related to communication and symbolic association.  
This is the same as saying that the neurophysiological basis for language, thought, 
purposeful intercommunication and mind reading could have begun not in the final 
stage of hominization, with Homo sapiens, but rather in the initial moments in the 
Homo habilis species (Tobias, 1987a; Tobias, 1987b). Besides it may  be the correct  
model of early acquisition of individual and distinctive cognitive abilities in the Homo
genus, it is certain that within this genus and especially from Homo erectus extra
alometric increases were produced in the brain (greater than that of the increase in 
body size).  Terrence Deacon has  made even more precise the hypothesis pointing 
to certain changes in the frontal cortex -already in Homo sapiens - as responsible for 
the appearance of the complex human cognitive abilities (Deacon, 1997; Deacon,
1996).  
The frontal cortex houses functions such as planning and decision-making 
that seem to be derived more from the need to interact with the members of this 
complex social group than the need to  solve other problems related to the
environment.  It could be said then that one of the main pressures that led humans to 
evolve in the form in which they have were humans themselves in their social 
dimension.  It has always been much more difficult, since the beginning, to be able to 
predict the behavior of the person beside you than the succession of the seasons in
the year, repeated systematically throughout the centuries.  The same reasons as 
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those that we mentioned before regarding the need to justify the appearance of 
expensive brain tissue apply in greater force to explain the last expansion of the 
modern cortex in human beings with modern appearance.
It is probable that the best reason for the great neocortex development in
Homo sapiens should refer to a cognitive phenomenon linked to the recognition of 
the other and the valorization of his behavior: the treatment of reciprocity understood 
as humans “own function”. 
The idea of “own function”  was coined by Ruth Millikan in 1984 and refers 
to the essential and exclusive constituents of the manner of acting of our species, 
that is considered linked to the nature itself of any human being regardless of 
temporal or geographic differences.  According to Domènech (1998), the last Hayek 
was very concerned with the implications of such a concept, because he saw in the 
existence of “own functions” of our moral institutions a threat to the ultraliberal social 
order defended by von Hayek.  As he said : “man’s innate instincts are not for a 
society such as that in which we live.  Instincts are adapted to life in small groups 
(...).  Civilization has brought only individualization and differentiation.  Primitive 
thinking consists basically of sentiments common to the members of the small 
groups.  Modern collectivism is a fallback to this  savage state, an attempt to 
reconstruct the strong ties that are found in limited groups” (von Hayek, 1983: 164-
165).  But the discomfort that a concept like this may produce is not the real problem.  
The essential question is how much own functions can be detected and documented
in the origins of human socialization and to what extent these functions continue to 
mark the territory of moral intuitions as a group living system.  Because of this, the 
intention of avoiding the “wild state”  meaning “natural” could become not only a 
great but also very dangerous mistake.
Can these human “own functions” be documented?
The needs to infer and predict the behavior of the others, maintain social 
cohesion and intragroup cooperation and solve routine problems of survival, 
reproduction, social  interchange in group life in our species have led to the fixing of 
very subtle mechanisms to assess group attitudes.  The problems the existence of 
egoists camouflaged  as altruists present to  a group of cooperators and the need to 
identify and punish who assumes a such social role, is an aspect which has been 
discussed frequently in sociobiology and ethology.  Indeed studies by Cosmides et 
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al.  suggest that natural selection could have fixed certain circuits in the human brain
specialized in analysis of social interchange, capable of detecting deceitful behaviors 
(Cosmides ,1989; Stone, Cosmides, Tooby, Kroll & Knight,2002; Sugiyama, Tooby &  
Cosmides, 2002).  Thus the establishment of co-operative contracts would be more 
than a universal cultural tendency: it would suppose a human trait characteristic of 
our species, as characteristic as  language and abstract thought.  It would indeed 
signify the main factor of conditioning and development of the cognitive abilities of 
people, relationships, motives, and the emotions and the intentions that are 
manifested in social environment.
According to Ridley (1996), reciprocity weighs like the sword of Damocles 
over the head of each human being: obligation, duty, debt, favor, adjustment, 
contract, exchange, business ... there is no shortage of ideas of reciprocity and 
social exchange in our language and our lives.  What the others do with (and for) us 
and think of our behavior is very important for our moral attitudes.  Thanks to the 
principal of reciprocity and reasoning in terms of social contract, cooperative
relations have become a practical base of social life.  The sense of debt, of the need 
to return any gift or  favor, seems to be universal and probably corresponds to an 
innate predisposition evolved in a language, in the Homo genus, whose social ties 
were established in a hunter-gatherer world  where daily survival depended on the 
degree of social interchange and strength of the cohesion of the social ties created 
among the members of the group.
In truth, one of the most important consequences of the pioneer 
experiments by Cosmides referred to previously is the fact that they obtained firm
indications that the formation of a contract is not the product of a single rational 
faculty that operates equally through all the agreements established among the 
parties that negotiate.  The process includes an ability, the detection of deceit, that 
has been developed to exceptional levels of acuteness and fast calculation.  The 
detection of the “deceiver” stands out over the detection of the simple error and 
raises the basic question of the establishment of social relationships, altruistic or not.  
Thus a contract is an implication of the form “if you want to obtain a benefit, you have 
to meet a requirement”.  The deceivers who intended to take the benefit without 
meeting the requirement (Pinker, 2000) should be able to be detected.
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The ability to detect is set in motion as a computational procedure only 
when the costs and benefits of a social contract are specified.  More than the error, 
more than the good reasons, and more even than the margin of benefit, what calls 
attention is the possibility that others deceive us: something like this activates our 
moral intuitions and feelings and is the main source for the appearance of hostile 
attitudes; in short deceit imbalances the four relational social ties  1) communal 
sharing; 2) authority ranking; 3) market pricing; and 4) equality matching in our social 
interchanges.  Thus the human mind seems to possess a lie detector with its own 
logic: when the standard reference “clean game” and result of the lie detector
coincide, people usually act (although not always) following the rational logic 
established by the Homo oeconomicus model; when the references and the 
detection are different, another type of thought appears to punish the deceivers.  In 
reality the concept of deceit can reach very subtle values.  
Let us consider the so-called ultimatum game, where a first actor A1 must
offer to a second actor A2 part of the sum of money that was offered to the first, so 
that if the second accepts the offer both obtain their reward but if he refuses it, both 
end up without anything.  An idea of rational human logic would lead to the
understanding that A2 should accept any quantity that A1 offers; after all, it is always 
be more than nothing.  But it does not happen like this; because below a certain
percentage share, the subjects of the experiments refuse the agreement.  Perhaps 
the most interesting regarding the identification by Sanfey et al. (Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003) of the brain areas  implied in this root decision
directly linked to a sense of justice: the result are the same as, in the model by 
Damasio of the somatic marker (Damasio, 1994) are part of the neural network of 
frontal limbic interconnection.
Our minds, say Sober and Wilson (2000), were formed by psychological 
mechanisms that evolved to favor adaptive behavior related to the interest in the 
well-being of others and with the typical predispositions of any species designed to 
be social, trustworthy, and cooperative.  Human beings are immersed in social 
instincts: they come into the world equipped with the predisposition to learn to 
cooperate, to distinguish the just from the deceitful, to be loyal, to earn a good 
reputation, to exchange products and information, to share work and to model their 
individuality and social ties from the reactions of the other.  In this respect we are 
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unique.  And in large measure we are this way thanks to the way in which our brains 
function.
5. Mental Modularity
How do they do it?  One of the most complex and also one of the most 
interesting aspects for any investigation that aims to study the functions of the 
human brain is its modular character.  The most decided hypothetical proposal about 
the existence of brain modules to process determined mental functions was carried 
out within the so-called “cognitive functionalism” by Fodor and Chomsky.  It weighs 
the great differences that the module theory of one and another establish (see Cela 
Conde & Marty, 1998), the main points in common that should be considered for the 
purpose of this article are (1) the mind is a functional state of the brain (that implies 
denial of any dualism that, as Cartesian, gives  the mind an ontological statute 
separate from the biology of the brain and independent from it); (2) brain events that 
lead to mental functions take place by computational processes (they are therefore 
based on the “activated” or “deactivated” state of the basic elements that 
interconnect: the neurons); (3) each cognitive function can be considered a “module”
of our mental architecture (the equivalent of a dominion-specific  “organ”: language, 
numerical capacity, etc.);(4) the modules function from mostly innate brain 
components (they also need environmental elements to reach maturity of the mental 
organs during the ontogenesis of the individual).
Mental modularity has been understood in many ways, as we say, by the 
different authors of computational functionalism.  The  most interesting exposition of
the effects that are dealt with in this article is by Noam Chomsky, for two reasons.  
The first, that its cognitive architecture is highly compatible with the findings of the 
neurosciences.  The second, closely related to the first, is that there are empirical 
descriptions about the neurological components of such mental organs.  But before 
entering in details it is interesting to consider a crucial aspect: the interaction among 
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the brain processes and the formed environment, that in our species refer to a group 
in strict social living.
Let us consider a very well-known mental function: language.  The Chomsky 
model of development of the linguistic competence passes through the presence 
some of the abilities in the genetic components of human nature that give any 
newborn the possibility of developing a determined language.  These components 
must be strong and complete enough to allow the language creator of great syntactic 
and semantic precision to be installed in a very short time - a few years - and without 
a specific learning program.  But the innate components cannot be so wide as to 
impose the grammar of a particular language.  Any child, of whatever that ethnic 
group, will learn the language of the group in which it grows up in.  The social 
dimension of language therefore imposes its rules.
Can the same competency development model be extended to other mental
models/organs?  The reply seems to be affirmative.  The brain reaches maturity 
during ontogeny also regarding any other mental module or “organ” and not only by 
that of language.  It seems reasonable to admit, therefore, that our valorizations are, 
for the most part, the result of the dominions in a permanent state of interaction:(A) a 
set of genetic determinations that stimulate us to maintain moral attitudes, to assess 
and prefer, and that belong to the common genome of our species; and (B) a set of 
moral values of the group that is a cultural construction so that this value
construction (and transmission) takes place historically in each society and in each 
epoch.  A universe of preferences results from the interaction where one is not free 
to take just any path.  Our valorizations are determined in by great traits by the innate 
tendency to determined conducts, that can be considered the true source of human 
values.  It is important to bear this in mind because shared moral and juridical
valorizations have the most likelihood of success in the future.  It seems convenient 
to use this fact, as far as possible, at the time of elaborating ethical and normative 
precepts.
As Antonio Damasio (2001) stated, ethical values constitute strategies 
acquired for the survival of the individuals of our species, but such acquired skills 
have a neurophysiological support in the base neural systems that execute the 
instinctive conducts.  The brain processes that are related to the emotions are deeply
articulated with those that perform assessment calculations, on the establishment of 
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neural networks that connect the frontal lobe with limbic system.  Thus if the ethical-
juridical choice is based on assessment reasoning and also on emotion and moral 
sentiments done by the brain, it cannot be considered as totally independent from 
the constitution and the functioning of this organ acquired in the evolutionary history 
of our species.
Therefore we find ourselves with the very important role of social life: that of 
directing the innate human component towards certain specific dominions.  Imagine 
many evolutionary banners under which a similar scheme, of interaction between the 
individual nature of beings that live in a group and the presence of collective cultural 
values, provide ingentes  adaptive advantages.  But within this multitude of 
hypotheses there is one that should be considered immediately: the law as part of 
the social environment.  The “juridical certainty” can be understood very well within 
the model as a social and cultural solution for the adaptive problems related to the 
capacity and need to predict the actions of the members of the group and their 
consequences.
The origin and evolution of our “contractual behavior”, that is, of the law as 
an artifact of culture, allows us to understand that the moral precepts and juridical
norms are the result of a long road of adaptation and to the long time passed since 
the appearance of our species.  Cultural transmission has been adaptive since its
origin by permiting  that the individuals diminish time and costs necessary for learning 
a conduct in terms of evolutionary efficacy (Boyd and Richerson, 1985).  The same 
can be said regarding the cultural artifact called law.
6. The natural universe of the law
As intentional beings, any human action, that is, any movement, any 
thought, any sentiment or emotion that is intentional, responds to the specific form as 
natural selection modeled our brain giving us an adaptive advantage.  The objectives
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of our actions are reached by strategies directly linked to human nature, without loss 
– clearly - of admitting wide variations resulting from insertion in the social cultural 
group in which we live.  Culture influences both to accentuate or decrease the most
deeply rooted tendencies of human nature.
This double action of nature/culture has produced, during the long course of 
our evolutionary process, some strategies and mechanisms designed to solve 
determined adaptive problems.  If they fulfill their purpose, we say such mechanisms 
and strategies are valuable (they are good) and as such, are capable of 
accumulating traditions that, always in a continuous line of renovation, are 
transmitted from generation to generation based on individual actions of people 
influenced by this triple set of elements from nature, culture and history both modern
and ancient, of humanity.
Given this situation, of such ample temporal and cultural diversity, the 
hypothesis that all human beings without significant exception tend to valorize as 
good the same thing will lead to the statement thatit cannot be because we have not 
all agreed on the goodness. Such a shared value would be based on the natural 
psychology of the human species by giving an effective solution to the adaptive 
problems of the moment.
Do such universal values exist that are either positive or negative?  All 
human beings seem to valorize, for example, intragroup cooperation, but at the same 
time distrust intragroup cooperation when the proposal comes from outside.  We 
value group cohesion, kinship relationships, submission or obedience to a leader, the 
ability to rise in social hierarchy, altruistic conduct, child protection and education, 
strategic alliances, friendship, sex, moderate unruliness, exchange relationships,
controlled risk; we value sincerity, but also reciprocity and safety and we hate deceit 
and injustice - at least when they affect us personally.  There is only one explanation 
for this: because evolution by natural selection produced a human mind with the 
parameters necessary for us to behave in this way typical of our species.
Natural selection modeled our brain with the result that we care more about 
some things than others.  Our cognitive architecture - functionally integrated and 
dominion-specifically homogeneous for all human beings - imposes strong 
constrictions on the perception, storage and discriminatory transmission of social and 
cultural representations.  In other words, the limits observed in the diversity of the 
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ethical and normative announcements are the reflection of the structure and 
functioning of our cognitive architecture.  The biological characteristics of our brain 
establish the space of the norms of conduct that we can learn and follow.  This 
principle, defended in the so-called “second social biology” (Lumsden & Wilson, 
1983) follows from other proposals prior to the style of Waddington and the 
epigenetic landscapists.  It implies that if the cultural solutions are contingent and are 
historical in character, they moved within some narrow possibility limits set out by 
human nature.  We tend to valorize certain things in detriment to others and the 
values guaranteed by our conduct norms describe (in most part) our natural moral 
aptitudes: we value that which admits outside  of our limited capacity to learn to 
value it.
Unlike that established by the Homo oeconomicus model, that encourages 
us to behave morally and juridically is not the deliberate calculation that doubt among 
the possibilities of obtaining a certain benefit on complying with an established norm
and the risk run of being discovered and punished for error.   Nor do we function on a 
conscious adhesion to rationally analyzed and accepted norms.  Certain moral 
intuitions and sentiments come into play surreptitiously, spontaneously, without us 
realizing the error: empathy, remorse, shame, humility, sense of honor, prestige, 
compassion, companionship.
As we have shown, such intuitions are based on innate predispositions of 
our cognitive architecture for learning and manipulation certain inherent social skills 
inherent to brain biology, skills that appeared during the evolution of our hominid
ancestors to avoid or prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in group life.   These 
traits, that we could call tendencies more than characteristics, that best illustrate the 
origins and the reality of man´s  moral and juridical behavior.
Indeed if men get together and live in society it is because it is the only way 
in which they can survive.  In this way specific social values have developed: the 
feeling of belonging and loyalty to the group and its members; respect for life and 
property; altruism; empathy; anticipation of the consequences of actions ... they are 
practices that appear as necessary in the course of common daily life that later give
way to the concepts of justice, moral, law, duty, responsibilit y, freedom, equality, 
dignity, guilt, security and betrayal, among many others.
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What counts in the end is the fact that the tendency to  separation between 
the material and spiritual has led to the absolutism of some of these values -
distancing them from their origins and from the specific reasons that created them
and presenting them as transcendent entities above and beyond human beings,
ethics and law only acquire a solid base when they are linked to our cognitive 
architecture structured in  specific dominion modules, that is, from human nature 
based on genetic inheritance and developed in a cultural environment.  It therefore 
could be said that the codes of the human species are a peculiar consequence of 
our humanity  itself, and this, in turn, “constitutes the basis of our cultural unity”
(Maturana, 2002).  
The axiologic and normative project of an ethical community is no more than 
a cultural artifact manufactured and used to enable the survival, reproductive 
success and group life of the individuals.  It also serves to express (and much to 
control and/or manipulate) our intuitions and our moral emotions, translating and 
composing in social adaptive formulas of living together the instinctive aspiration of 
justice that has moved us throughout the evolutionary history of our species.  From 
this the juridical norms dictate sexual practices, foment certain types of social 
relationship ties in detriment to others, regulate freedom and equality and prohibit -
under certain circumstances - aggression and violence.
It seems inescapable that we must accept the fact that we are the result of 
two different processes, whose confluence, if we can call it this, constitutes us as 
humans: a biological process of hominization (the sum of mutations, recombination 
and natural selection by which Homo sapiens is distinguished from the species that it 
descends from) and a historic process of humanization (by adding different keys to 
the purely biological: rules, moral, language, culture, civilization).  The two processes 
are very juxtaposed as different  and even antagonistic; the example of the position 
of von Hayek mentioned previously against the “own function”  of the human being.  
It is probable, however, that this translation of the classical opposition nature/nurture
developed from a mistake: that the historical cultural constructions and the biological 
evolution events are independent processes.  
An interesting negation of this supposed isolation between nature and 
culture, sustained by the second social biology, establishing the appearance of both
human nature and the cultural expressions of the values of cohesion of the group 
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through any coevolutionary model and coordinated evolution among genes and 
culture (Lumsden & WIlson, 1981).  The model of coevolution sustains, for example, 
that the normative cultural representations related to subjects of sex, family and 
power trigger strong reactions and are more prosperous in terms of “genetic 
replication”  because they concern aspects of great importance in our evolutionary 
past (Brody, 1996).
It is not easy to go beyond the theoretical model sustained by a strong 
mathematical apparatus by Lumsden and Wilson. How could you prove the empirical 
effect of the presence of social relationships on the fertility of the group of
Australopithecus, for example?  But it is also a speculative hypothesis, the sense of 
an evolutionary process of some beings who, from the small bands of 70 to 150 
hunter-gatherers on the savanna, whose survival depended directly on the 
maintenance of social cohesion, progressively multiplied and concentrated
themselves: first in small towns and later in large nations until transforming
themselves in a “global society”.  Indeed this is, except for the distances, the same 
scheme that led to the great ideal of universal citizenship by the illustrious Kant and 
Goethe and that, certainly, is very different from the neoliberal globalization process 
of our times.  
In any case the phenomenon is accompanied by an accelerated increase 
both in the knowledge and complexity of the relational social ties and structures -
especially what the existing information and communication systems do among the 
members of our species -  that permits a much faster and wider interaction among 
the social groups and at the same time, requires a substantial increase in the 
integrating norms of common action.  In the end, as has been said before, the 
progressive increase in the complexity of the reciprocal interchange required, (and 
continues to require) an adaptive strategy based on an ability to predict evermore 
sophisticated conducts.
Thus we arrive at the human laws, this blind cultural and institutional tool, 
virtually neutral and with potential linking ability to predict and regulate human 
behavior whatever nature or degree of imperativeness.  It seems reasonable to 
suppose that, as happens now, there existed continuous norms for the exercise of 
rights in all human societies (although they were very precarious on occasion) on the 
part of the members of the group.  Norms capable of establishing the rules of living 
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together  regarding power, property distribution and use, family structure or some 
other community entity, work distribution and exchange regulation in general.  Norms 
that, to solve certain adaptive programs, shaped the collective environment and 
historically conditioned our ability and innate need to predict the behavior of the 
others and justify our actions.
As it seems to have occurred with biological evolution, the  evolution
process of the norms did not take place linearly without trial or error. Human beings 
are characterized by trying different normative solutions and adopting those that 
seem most efficacious at a certain moment, until they are  sustained by others.  As 
flexibility in human contact and the diversity of the cultural representations are, 
although limited, wide and, on the other hand, given that the cultural alterations can 
be transmitted very quickly and efficaciously, the process of normative evolution is 
subject to great leaps and bounds and even, at times, significant declines.  It is this, 
perhaps, the best evolutionist explanation of the so-called unjust laws.  
Our  relational social ties are, as a result that is difficult to deny, deficient 
and our ability to predict and anticipate the consequences of actions is far from 
perfect, but it is in any case better than nothing.  Without norms we would not have 
evolved; at least not in the form that we did.  But we have the law and, with it, we 
promote in some groups as complex as man the means necessary to control and 
predict good and bad actions, to justify the collective behaviors and what is most
important, to articulate, combine and establish limits on the four elementary models 
of relational social ties, communal sharing,  authority ranking,  market pricing, and 
equality matching.  Thanks to the juridical universe, shaped in the last degree on 
explicit codes, human beings manage in their own interaction of social structure a
partition (Which should be called, with the necessary caution about the concept, 
“consensual”) all of the rights and duties that arise in community life.
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7. Consequences of the evolutionary concept of law.
The first hominids appeared as African monkeys in an environment that has 
been identified as the typical tropical forest both in the Rift Valley and South Africa 
(Rainer, Moon & Masters, 1993; WoldeGabriel et al., 1994).  With bipedalism as the 
distinctive trait, millions of years later our ancestors  became colonizers of the open 
African savannas in a process that coincided with the appearance of the first stone 
industries and the first examples of the human genus, that is, Homo habilis and its 
olduvail culture (Leakey, Tobias & Napier, 1964).  A panorama like this indicates that 
the first evolutionary transformations fixed by natural selection took place under very 
different ecological and cultural circumstances from those we have today.  But it was 
then that the process began of forming a mind equipped with modules that process
all of the cognitive contents pertinent for adaptation in a group.
It is impossible to establish the origin of the law, even if understood in the 
most wide and flexible manner imaginable.  But we have sustained that this origin 
has to do with an adaptive challenge that human beings faced: a challenge that 
came from the human need to understand and valorize his congeners  behavior, to 
respond to it, to predict and manipulate it and, from this, establish and regulate the 
most complex relationships of life in a group.  Other species such as the chimpanzee 
suffered very similar selective pressures and even so, did not develop our systems of 
norms established by explicit periods.  There is little doubt therefore about the unique 
character of the law as a tool to solve group conflicts.  But the distinctive character
does not mean that the law is free from any type of trace that arises from the specific 
circumstances in which the coordinated evolution of the human brain, of the hominid
groups and of their cultural solutions were produced.  Moral sentiments derived from 
our innate cognitive architecture and from the ethical and juridical codes, that arose 
as products of the interaction of biology and culture.  
But is an important to understand that it is a process of mutual inferences, 
so that the first normative expressions must have changed the development 
environment of social intelligence.  Understood from this viewpoint, the laws are not 
simply a set of spoken, written or formalized rules that people follow. They represent 
the formalization of behavioral rules, on which a high percentage of people agree.  
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They reflect the behavior inclinations and offer potential benefits to those that follow 
them.  When people do not recognize these potential benefits the laws are, 
frequently, not only ignored or disobeyed but their compliance becomes conditioned 
to authority that the laws impose by means of brute force (Margaret Gruter, 1991).
Similarly, we formulate value choices about to the just and the unjust not by 
calculated reasons, as the games theory and the juridical interpretations theory
express, but rather because we are equipped with certain innate moral intuitions and 
certain emotional stimuli that characterize human sensitivity and allow us to connect 
potentially with other human beings.  Thus the virtues of tolerance, compassion and 
justice are not political formulas that we strive to reach but rather commitments that 
we assume and hope that others assume.  If we understand the Law beyond the
formal expression of the codes, is not an intellectual construction.  It appeared as 
part of our nature from a long and tortuous evolutionary process and, to understand 
it, we should look to the inside, to the way the  mind/brain set processes instincts and 
the predispositions that permit the creation and exploitation of the relational social 
ties already existing and whose genesis should then be reintegrated in the 
evolutionary history of our species.
If it was inevitable that Hobbes and Rousseau lacked an evolutionist 
perspective, it is less pardonable that some of their intellectual descendents also 
lacked it.  The philosopher John Rawls - although at the time dealing with the 
problem of stability of the principles of justice starting from the assumption that 
certain evolved psychological principles are correct, at least approximately – asks us 
to imagine rational beings that come together to create a society from nothing, as 
Rousseau imagined a solitary and self-sufficient prototype human being.  To be sure
they are intellectual experiments but are they based on reasonable requiresments. It 
does not seem so.  To speak of a starting point prior to society is absurd.  Current 
human groups were born from groups of Homo erectus and these from groups of 
Australopithecus, and these in turn, from ancestors common to humans and 
chimpanzees that were probably some animals with a certain social life.
Thus it must be defended that between the world of the “is” and the world of 
the “should be” there is a manifest and intimate relationship, sufficient reason to 
consider our ethical faculty as an analogue of other mental faculties.  Admitting that 
the dominion-specific diffusion of the ties of  communal sharing, authority ranking, 
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market pricing and equality matching exists because they are incorporated 
necessarily in our cognitive architecture (forming ties that support the universal 
divisions in culture), is the safest way to discover the basis of the juridical means of 
explanation and articulation of social human conduct and of the relational social ties.  
Once it is admitted that all law has a relational character, and all juridical relation 
resides, in the final analysis, on a social relationship –that is one of the four 
elemental models of relational social ties established by man, which, in their turn, 
always have the individual as subjects, the function and finality of the juridical
discourse consists both of the combined articulation of the referred relational social
ties and of the duty of each operator to act in reason of the person and for the 
human person.  In other words, law is no more and no less than a social adaptive 
strategy - ever more complicated but always insufficient - used to articulate by acts 
that are qualified as “valuable” the relational social ties through which humans 
construct acceptable interaction systems and social structurization.  
This kind of artifact induces - or should induce - the design of a normative 
and institutional model that prevents arbitrary domination and interference in a social 
environment full of asymmetries and inequalities, ensuring a certain material 
equality, and, in the last instance, stimulating and guaranteeing ownership and the 
exercise of rights (and performance of duties) of every inalienable point and that 
publicly acknowledges the existence of citizens as completely free individuals.
8. From natural law to positive law
The task of the juridical-interpreter is to give “hermeneutic life” to positive 
law derived from such a conception.  A common mistake in the naturalist 
interpretations of the law - if they are of transcendent or Darwinian origin - consists in 
understanding that human nature contains what we could call the final product of the 
law. Such an explanation is rarely given,  but it is a necessary conclusion whenever 
we expound the determination of moral conduct and the ethical choices regarding 
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supra individual instances, that are of genetic and theological order.  If nature 
necessarily leads to a precise “moral sense”, then this moral condition is guaranteed 
without the need for any individual action.
The interactionist models we have studied and defended deny this 
dependency.  The dominion of human preferences is, as we have said many times, 
the result of the maturation within a social group and with understanding of historical 
events, maturation that leads from the general constrictions to the perception and 
storage of the cognitive representations to the final -and very plastic – repertory of 
the activity patterns of our brain and those which emerge in our conduct.
Human nature imposes what we could call the “rules of the game” but not 
the final result.  The most significant, however, of the naturalist approach is the 
possibility of fixing, within these rules of the game, certain high ranking values that 
stem  from the character of the law as an instrument for social life.  For much of the 
cultural diversity and the facility of acculturation allow the imposition of part of almost 
any juridical rule - and history shows us a catalog of proposals that led to monstrous 
situations - the “aberrant” rules are  basically contrary to the moral intuitions fixed by 
natural selection.  Given its evolutionist viewpoint, Rawls´ Theory of Justice is based 
on this assumption.  The human being possesses a moral quantification system 
which permits him to qualify as good  not any action he performs unless very 
concrete: those in which “good” means “good for everyone” (Tugendhat, 1979).  
This does not mean that the “good for everyone” ideal  has always been 
complied with, nor does it assume it will always be complied with in the future.  But it 
establishes a line of moral progress: the one linked to the ever greater extension of 
the group called “everyone”.  If in the Aristotelian epoch the moral doctrine included 
only citizens, and in the Putney Bridge debates citizens are the category which 
includes those without material possesssions, it is not untill the XX century that 
“everyone” means in at least countries -  half of humanity: that there is the female
sex.  A line of progress around the universal concepts of “good” claims, for example ,
the intention to prevent or diminish human misery and unhappiness (that suffering is 
not produced when it can be prevented, and that inevitable suffering is minimized 
and effects the individual members of society, the citizens in moderation).
Indeed, the success or failure of humanity depends greatly on the way in 
which the institutions that govern public life are able to incorporate the perspective of 
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human nature in principles, methods and laws.  Understanding human nature, its 
limited rationality, its emotions and its feelings seems to be the best way to formulat e
an institutional and normative design that, reducing human suffering, permits each 
one to live (to to live with the other) in a search for a common humanity.
This means, in modest and more realistic terms, a specific and virtuous 
commitment - in the sense of Machiavellian virtue – on the part of the law operator at 
the time of defining and constituting institutional, normative discursive and social 
cultural designs as close as possible to the functions of our intuitions and moral 
emotions.  And when this is not entirely possible, that they define institutional 
normative discourse and social cultural designs opposed to the always possible 
perverse manipulation of these intuitions and emotions.  The institutional model that
best reflects, of all those we know,  the ideal of this law generated by an evolutionary 
interaction of biological nature and culture is  the democratic republic defended by 
the illustration.  
And not only because the Republican tradition is capable of recognizing 
plurality in the motivations of human social life - something that assumes a notable 
initial advantage regarding the motivational monism of the Liberal tradition, - even 
because  its open peculiar will of ethical-political model brings citizenship values and 
useful juridical political methodology to understand law as an instrument of social 
construction and, especially, to simulate the formal and material exchanges of the 
decision taking process within the fluid dynamic of the world of everyday life.
We are convinced that the time has arrived to transport the problem of law 
to a different and more fruitful plane.  And although an evolutionist, functional and 
biological perspective cannot determine whether this exchange is adequate nor that 
measures should be taken to create, in the case of opting for it, a desirable mutation, 
it will certainly serve to inform on questions of practical relevance.  Who operates the 
law can act in unison with human nature or against it, but he is more likely to obtain 
efficacious solutions (consensual and controllable) modifying the environment where 
human nature is developed than undertaking the impossible task of altering our 
nature by these means.  In other words, it is the law that has to serve human nature 
and not the contrary.
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